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EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF ECONOMIC
STRIKERS TO REINSTATEMENT
In considering the reinstatement rights of striking employees, the
rule has been that those who strike in protest of unfair labor practices'
have an absolute right to reinstatement 2 even if they have been
permanently replaced.3 The reinstatement rights of employees who
strike over economic issues, however, have been interpreted differ-
ently.4 Ever since its decision in Bartlett-Collins Co.5 in 1954, the
National Labor Relations Board has held that economic strikers who
are permanently replaced are entitled only to nondiscriminatory
treatment as applicants for new employment.6 Under this rule a
permanently replaced economic striker lost any right to reinstatement
in his job and could enjoy no competitive advantage in attempting
to regain his previous position.
With its recent decision in Laidlaw Corp.,7 however, the Board
explicitly rejected its earlier rule and expanded the rights of eco-
nomic strikers to reinstatement. Approximately seventy employees
struck when the employer and the union failed to reach agreement
during contract negotiations. About a month later some forty strikers
made unconditional written applications to return to work, but an
employer spokesman stated that at that time many of the strikers
had been ". . . permanently replaced and [were] not entitled to re-
"'Unfair labor practices" are proscriptions provided by the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1965). Note 9 infra.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956). See, e.g., Snow v.
NLRB, 3o8 F.2d 687, 694 (9th Cir. 1962).
3NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883
(1954).
'Economic strikers have only a limited right to reinstatement since the em-
ployer may permanently replace them. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938); see, e.g., Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
S11o N.L.R.B. 385 (1954). In Bartlett-Collins, a short economic strike re-
sulted in the permanent replacement of nearly all of the strikers prior to the
termination of the strike. When the strikers then applied for reinstatement, the
employer placed their names on a list and stated that they would be called if
and when there were future openings. The Board refused to characterize the
employer's action as constituting any sort of preferential hiring agreement, and
held that permanently replaced economic strikers were not entitled to preferential
status in hiring and were simply in the position of applicants for new employ-
ment. Id. at 397-98.
"See Brown & Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961); Atlas Storage Div., 112
N.L.R.,B. 1175 (1955).
'68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968). Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is pending.
CASE COMMENTS
instatement."s During the next few days, the employer reinstated
some of the strikers while continuing to hire and advertise for new
applicants. Also during this time, the employer sent termination
notices to those strikers not reinstated or offered reinstatement. These
notices stipulated that they had been replaced as of the date of their
original applications and that no jobs were available. The strikers,
including some of those who had been reinstated, then renewed the
strike protesting the termination notices as being an allegedly unfair
labor practice.
The union filed charges including, among others, that the em-
ployer had violated sections 8 (1) and (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act 9 by discriminating against the strikers in refusing re-
instatement even though replacements filled most of their positions
at the time they first sought to return to work. The Board agreed with
the Trial Examiner in finding that the employer's conduct 0 was
11d. at 1255. The offer was made on behalf of all of the strikers even though
they all did not appear and submit individual applications for reinstatement.
Strikers who had not submitted individual applications for reinstatement and
subsequently did so, were either reinstated or offered reinstatement if vacancies
existed; otherwise, they were considered permanently replaced if there were then
no jobs available.
"Sections 8 (1) and (3) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
i 158(a) (s) and (3) (1965), provide:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(s) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 [Section 7 of the NLRA] of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization ....
Section 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
"'In characterizing the employer's conduct here as violative of the NLRA, the
Board relied on NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), for its
provisions laying down a general test of the nature of employer conduct de-
terminative of an unfair labor practice. The Great Dane Trailers test is divided
into two parts, depending upon the degree to which employee rights are
affected, and each part is predicated on a threshold finding of discriminatory
employer conduct. In the first part, if the employer's discriminatory conduct may
be termed "inherently destructive" of employee rights, an unfair labor practice
is made without the usually required showing of antiunion motivation, even if
the employer has introduced business justifications for his actions. Under the
second part, if the employer's discriminatory conduct carries only a slight adverse
effect upon employee rights, independent evidence of antiunion motivation is
required in finding an unfair labor practice if the employer shows business
reasons for his conduct. Id. at 34. Thus, discriminatory conduct which adversely
1969]
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indicative of an unfair labor practice since he had discriminated
against the strikers in not fairly considering them even as applicants
for new employment. 1" Yet the Board further stated that even if
there had been no conversion of the strike from an economic one
to an unfair labor practice strike, and the strikers had remained
economic strikers throughout, they still would have had a right to
reinstatement when the depature of the permanent replacements
created the subsequent vacancies.
12
affects employee rights to any extent raises a presumptive unfair labor practice
which the employer may or may not overcome when business justifications are
shown. In either case, a per se violation of section 8 (3) results where the employer
fails to bring forth evidence of legitimate business motives for his conduct. This
formula for measuring employer conduct was developed by the Supreme Court
as an adaptation of language from its recent decisions which had considered
employer motivation in the context of alleged violations of the NLRA. See
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 3oo (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 38o
U.S. 278 (1965); NLRaB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). The Court in
Great Dane Trailers found it unnecessary to consider any question of the degree
of harm produced by the employer's conduct since there was no showing of
business justification whatsoever. Hence, there was a per se violation, and the
Court avoided having to categorize the employer's conduct under the "inherently
destructive" label. Great Dane Trailers thus furnishes no particular guidance as
to what employer conduct may be termed "inherently destructive" of employee
rights. Such guidance, however, has been provided elsewhere. In NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), where an employer awarded superior seniority
rights to both new employees who replaced strikers and to strikers who left the
strike and returned to work, the Court held such conduct to be of the "inherently
destructive" variety. The Court in other cases has merely suggested definitive
examples of this category of employer conduct. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312 (1965) (many employees have broken established rules,
but union leaders alone are discharged); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17, 46 (1954) (disparate wage treatment among employees is based solely upon
their status as union members). In Laidlaw, however, the Board went awry when it
erroneously predicated its finding of conduct "inherently destructive" of employee
rights on the employer's failure to show any business justifications for his action.
Under the first part of the Great Dane Trailers test involving "inherently de-
structive" conduct, any showing of business reasons is irrelevant.
168 L.R.R.M. at 1256. The evidence substained this finding in that the
employer had, in effect, threatened his employees that if they struck they would
"lose forever" their right to employment by his company. Futher discrimination
was found from the fact that the employer had disregarded the availability of
older, more experienced employees (the replaced strikers) while continuing to
advertise for and hire new workers to fill vacancies. Such practices were proscribed
under the old rule which stated that permanently replaced economic strikers
were entitled to be free of discrimination as applicants for new employment.
"Id. at 1257. As the Board found an unfair labor practice had been committed,
the strike was thus converted from an economic one into an unfair labor practice
strike. Consequently, from the time of the conversion, the strikers were unfair
labor practice strikers and had an absolute right to reinstatement. See notes 2 and
3 supra. For an analysis of the strike conversion process, see Stewart, Conversion
of Strikes: Economic to Unfair Labor Practice I & II, 45 VA. L. REV. 1322 (1959),
49 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1963).
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Discarding its established rule, the Board found that the strikers
remained employees whose preferential rights to reinstatement were
not destroyed by the fact that permanent replacements occupied their
jobs at the time they first applied to return to work.' 3 Barlett-Collins
and other cases' 4 similarly holding to the effect that permanently
replaced economic stirkers are entitled only to nondiscriminatory
treatment as applicants for new employment were specifically over-
ruled by the Board.15
The new rule in Laidlaw provides that permanently replaced
economic strikers retain their preferential status as employees and
may be entitled to full reinstatement if and when future vacancies
occur. These rights may not be defeated unless the strikers have in
the meantime acquired similar jobs elsewhere, or unless the em-
ployer is able to establish substantial business reasons for his refusal
to offer reinstatement.26
In rejecting its established rule that the permanent replacement
of economic strikers extinguished their preferential status in hiring,
th Board in Laidlaw relied primarily upon a recent Supreme Court
ruling in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. 1 7 The employer in Fleet-
wood Trailer based his refusal to reinstate certain economic strikers
on the lack of available jobs owing to what was shown to have been
merely a temporary production adjustment (cutback) occasioned by
the strike itself.'8 Interpreting section 2(3) of the NLRA,' 9 the Court
reasoned that the strikers remained employees throughout the strike
and were thus entitled to preferential treatment and reinstatement.
20
There are, however, indications that the Court did not intend its
rule as to the reinstatement of economic strikers to encompass situa-
tions where economic strikers have been permanently replaced. De-
fining circumstances indicative of proper business objectives, the
Court stated:
2 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968).
"tCases cited note 6 supra. The Board additionally overruled all other cases
of similar import.
168 L.R.R.M. at 1258.
ldId.
17389 U.S. 375 (1967).
"Id. at 376.
OSection 2(3) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
152(3) (1964) provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and.., any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment....
389 U.S. at 378.
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In some situations, 'legitimate and substantial business justi-
fications' for refusing to reinstate employees who engaged in
an econmic strike have been recognized. One is when the jobs
which the strikers claim are occupied by workers hired as
permanent replacements during the strike in order to continue
operations.
21
While the Court in Fleetwood Trailer specifically found the em-
ployer guilty of an unfair labor practice without reference to intent
solely because of his failure to show any legitimate business reasons
for his conduct,22 it further stated that hiring workers as permanent
replacements in order to continue operations would in and of itself
be a business justification.
2 3
Laidlaw, as opposed to Fleetwood Trailer, specifically concerns the
rights of permanently replaced economic strikers to reinstatement.
In order to transcend the barrier of its previous rule which terminated
the employee status of permanently replaced economic strikers, the
Board reasoned that the situation in Fleetwood Trailer was of suffi-
cient similarity to allow application of the same rules in Laidlaw.
2 4
Thus, the permanently replaced strikers remained "employees" and
were entitled to reinstatement when vacancies occurred.
The difference between the nature of the temporary production
adjustment in Fleetwood Trailer and the permanent replacement of
strikers in Laidlaw, however, would seem to preclude the analogy upon
which the Board relied. The Board's finding that the permanently
replaced strikers remained employees thus rests upon the tenuous
ground of an equation of dissimilar situations.
25
"Id. at 379 (emphasis added). In this context, the Court cited the following
cases: NLRB v. Mackay & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLR.B v. Plastilite Corp.,
375 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1967); Brown & Root, 132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961). In Brown
& Root, the Board held that economic strikers were not entitled to reinstatement
since permanent replacements had been hired in their positions and no vacancies
existed for them at the time they first applied for reinstatement.
'389 U.. 375 (1967).
2In his concurring opinion in Fleetwood Trailer, Mr. Justice Harlan stated,
in effect, that the temporary production adjustment was not the equivalent of the
permanent replacement of strikers which destroyed their rights to preferential
rehiring. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1967) (concurring
opinion). This difference between the two situations has been noted elsewhere.
See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 366 F.2d 126, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion); 45 TExAs L. REv. 785 (1967).
268 L.R.R.M. at 1256-57.
-The dissimilarity may be further suggested by the Court's citation of
Brown &r Root, see note 21 supra. Brown & Root was specifically overruled by
the Board in Laidlaw based upon the ruling in Fleetwood Trailer. Certainly the
Court would not have cited with approval a case contradicting its basic holdings,
and the fact that it did so is indicative that both Brown & Root and Laidlaw,
which are similar, cannot be equated with Fleetwood Trailer.
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Since Fleetwood Trailer indicated that the rights of permanently
replaced economic strikers to reinstatement were not within its hold-
ing, the Board's new rule in Laidlaw extending these rights to perma-
nently replaced strikers seems to be analytically unwarranted. The
Board's improper analysis, however, does not necessarily signify an
improper result. If the Board had refrained from insistence upon
Fleetwood Trailer as justification for its new rule, and, instead, had
based its decision on the policy behind the NLRA itself, the basis
for the result in Laidlaw could have been measurably solidified.
In effect, the declared policy and purpose of the NLRA is to in-
sure an unobstructed national commercial environment, in part,
through the protection of specified employee rights.26 The Act
expresses a congessional purpose to emphasize the public importance
under modern economic conditions of protecting the rights of em-
ployees to organize into unions and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.2 7 The sanctions imposed by the Act are not punitive
measures directed against the employer, but rather are designed to
insure that the rights of employees are protected.28
Inevitably, then, the business interest served by allowing the
termination of an economic striker's right to preferential reinstatement
when he is permanently replaced (the pre-Laidlaw rule) must be
compared with its impact on employee rights granted by the Act.
In other words, the replacement rules contemplated by the Board
should be judged in light of sections 8 (1) and (3) of the NLRA
which define allowable employer practices.29 The prohibition against
the employer's discrimination in terms of employment to discourage
union membership includes discouraging participation in concerted
activities such as a legitimate strike.30 Obviously, an employee will
be discouraged from striking over economic issues where he may
CZThe National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449-5o (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1965), provides in part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce...
by encouraging... collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing ....
MAllen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
8o5 (1945). See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB
v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9 (1943)-
NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
See note 9 supra.
3cNLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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apprehend not only permanent replacement, but also deprivation of
any preferential status when he seeks reinstatement in vacancies oc-
curring subsequent to this replacement.
Any business interests to be served in allowing the continuing
vitality of the old rule would not seem to justify the resultant dis-
couragement of the employee's basic right to strike. It has long been
recognized that the primary business interest in allowing an em-
ployer to permanently replace economic strikers is that the continu-
ance of his operations may be facilitated when he can offer permanent
employment as an inducement to potential replacements. 31 However,
this interest could be preserved under the Laidlaw rule because even
though economic strikers retain their preferential status and rein-
statement rights when subsequent vacancies arise, they may still be
permanently replaced.
32
The Laidlaw rule offers the conformity with the policy and
purposes of the Act which was heretofore lacking, and although the
means to this end seem defective from the standpoint of a strict legal
analysis, the end itself is desirably ameliorative.
JAMEs K. CLUVEmUs
mNLRB v. Mackay Radio 8: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
1An argument against the rule allowing the permanent replacement of economic
strikers appears in Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J.
630 (1966).
